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ReviewReward, Motivation,
and Reinforcement Learning
brain report errors in the prediction of reward has been
a powerful (though not undisputed) organizing force for
a wealth of experimental data (see Schultz et al., 1997;
Peter Dayan1,3 and Bernard W. Balleine2,3
1Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit
University College London
Schultz, 2002 [this issue of Neuron]; Montague and17 Queen Square
Berns, 2002 [this issue of Neuron]). This theory derivesLondon WC1N 3AR
from reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998),United Kingdom
which shows how a particular form of the error (called2 Department of Psychology and
the temporal difference error) can be used to learn pre-the Brain Research Institute
dictions of reward delivery and also how the predictionsUniversity of California, Los Angeles
can be used to learn to choose an adaptive course ofBox 951563
action in terms of maximizing reward and minimizingLos Angeles, California 90095
punishment (Houk et al., 1995; Suri and Schultz, 1998,
1999). A popular reinforcement learning model called
the actor-critic has been used to offer an account of theThere is substantial evidence that dopamine is in-
main subdivisions of the midbrain dopamine system. Involved in reward learning and appetitive conditioning.
one version of this, the dopamine cells in the ventralHowever, the major reinforcement learning-based the-
tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra pars com-oretical models of classical conditioning (crudely, pre-
pacta (SNc) report the same prediction error, but turndiction learning) are actually based on rules designed
it to two different uses. VTA dopamine cells are associ-to explain instrumental conditioning (action learning).
ated with the critic, controlling the learning of valuesExtensive anatomical, pharmacological, and psycho-
held in the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala and thelogical data, particularly concerning the impact of mo-
orbitofrontal cortex. SNc dopamine cells are associatedtivational manipulations, show that these models are
with the actor, controlling the learning of actions in com-unreasonable. We review the data and consider the
petitive cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical loops (Alexan-involvement of a rich collection of different neural sys-
der and Crutcher, 1990).tems in various aspects of these forms of conditioning.
Here, we evaluate the actor-critic model of the dopa-Dopamine plays a pivotal, but complicated, role.
mine system from the perspective of the substantial
psychological and neurobiological data on motivation,Behavioral psychologists have long made a set of dis-
which is key to the modern view of reward learning. Thetinctions between classical/Pavlovian conditioning and
actor-critic model can be seen as a particular form ofinstrumental/operant conditioning. Both forms of condi-
one of the better accepted motivational theories, namelytioning concern the ways that animals learn to predict
incentive learning theory (Bindra, 1974, 1978; Bolles,and respond to important events in their environments,
1975; Toates 1986, 1994), in which stimuli associatedsuch as the delivery of appetitive and aversive stimuli
with positive reinforcers such as food or water (which(food/water and mild electric shocks, respectively). In
are known as Pavlovian excitors) are thought to actclassical conditioning, the outcomes are provided what-
as conditioned incentives for instrumental conditioning.ever the animals do, and so any changes in behavior
This is the conditioned reinforcement effect, that if a ratpresumably reflect innately specified reactions to pre-
observes that a particular light always comes on just
dictions of the outcomes. Conversely, in instrumental
before it receives some food, it will then learn to press
conditioning, whether or not an animal gets a reward or
a lever in order to get that light, even if in those learning
punishment depends on the actions it performs. Instru- trials no food is provided. Despite this solid foundation,
mental conditioning is thus closely related to the engi- the actor-critic model fails to take into account large
neering theory of optimal control and the computer sci- bodies of work (recently reviewed from a theoretical
ence theory of reinforcement learning, which both study perspective in Berridge, 2001; Dickinson and Balleine,
how systems of any sort can choose their actions to 2002) on the many psychological differences between
maximize rewards or minimize punishments. The opera- Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning in terms of mo-
tional distinction between classical and instrumental tivational processes and action determination and also
conditioning may seem like the sort of thing about which on the neural underpinnings of these differences.
only dyed-in-the-wool behaviorists could care. How- These data, together with those arguing against a
ever, critical issues turn on it, such as the organization simple conflation of Pavlovian conditioned responses,
of goal-directed behavior and motivational control, e.g., goal-directed instrumental actions, and habitual instru-
the way that animals head for water if thirsty but food mental actions, force substantial changes to both as-
if hungry. In this review, we argue that powerful and pects of the actor-critic model. Most critically, the foun-
predictive theories of the neural basis of appetitive con- dations of the relationship between Pavlovian and
ditioning have failed to respect important aspects of the instrumental conditioning in the existing dopaminergic
distinction and point the way toward their improvement. model are decimated by recent data suggesting that
The idea that dopamine cells in the vertebrate mid- there are at least two independent, largely anatomically
distinct, reward processes, only one of which appears
to be sensitive to dopaminergic manipulations. Modifi-3 Correspondence: dayan@gatsby.ucl.ac.uk (P.D.), balleine@
psych.ucla.edu (B.W.B.) cations to the critic are consequent on evidence as to
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the animal has first to choose the correct action at b
(namely D) in order to be able to perform the correct
action at g (namely L) in order to get any reward. Sequen-
tial decision problems (at least richer ones than this) are
tricky to solve. For instance, imagine that the rat chooses
to run D at b and then R at g. It gets no reward (OR 
0); but, how can it decide whether it performed correctly
at b and incorrectly at g, correctly at g but incorrectly
at b, or indeed incorrectly at both? This ambiguity is one
form of a problem called a temporal credit assignment
problem. As we will see, in the actor-critic method, the
critic learns to predict the expected reward starting from
each room (b or g), and its predictions are used to re-
Figure 1. Example Task solve ambiguities.
Animals are presented with two stimuli (blue [b] and green [g] lights) Key to the actor-critic method (Barto et al., 1983) is
defining two locations in a maze, at each of which they can choose a policy, which is a parameterized specification of how
one of two directions (U, D, R, and L). The actions have the conse- likely each action is to be chosen at each state (we use
quences shown, leading to outcomes that are either neutral (OU) or the notation pL(g) for the probability of choosing to gopotentially appetitive (OL and OR). In brackets opposite the actions
L at g). For instance, when the subject is put into theare the probabilities with which each is selected by a particular
maze for the first time, a natural policy for it wouldpolicy in a case in which food reward worth a nominal two units is
available at OL. This is a conceptual task; spatial mazes may engage specify that pU(b)  0.5, pD(b)  0.5, pL(g)  0.5, pR(g) 
different solution mechanisms. 0.5, if it has no intrinsic bias at either location. The
optimal policy, i.e., a policy which maximizes the reward
the rat will get, has pU(b) 0, pD(b) 1, pL(g) 1, pR(g)
how shifts in primary motivational states (such as hunger 0. The action probabilities in brackets in Figure 1 indicate
and thirst) exert an immediate effect on behavior. We another policy. The actor specifies the policy.
suggest that there are two routes to the Pavlovian incen- The other half of the actor-critic method is the critic.
tive predictions of the critic: a plastic one, copied from This evaluates states under policies in terms of the aver-
the original model, and a hard-wired one, with which age future reward starting from each. Take the policy
it competes and whose output is directly sensitive to shown in Figure 1. The value V(g) of state g is defined
classes of motivational manipulations. Conditioned naturally as the mean reward available in the task follow-
stimuli have access to this hard-wired route via stimulus ing the policy
substitution, another aspect of conditioning omitted
V(g)  probability of L  value of reward given Lfrom the original model.
The next section briefly describes the basic actor-
 probability of R  value of reward given R
critic. Following that, we review psychological and neu-
ral data on the Pavlovian control over actions and the  0.3  2  0.7  0
differences between Pavlovian and instrumental motiva-
 0.6. (1)tional processes and use it to criticize the actor-critic
model. Finally, we use it to sketch the bones of an alter- By contrast, under the optimal policy, V(g) 2 since the
native account, which is in better keeping with the data. rat always collects the two units of reward if it starts at
g. In conditioning terms, g acts as a conditioned stimulus
(CS) with respect to the unconditioned stimulus (US; theThe Actor-Critic
Figure 1 describes an example task that we use to help food) provided as the outcome OL. The value V(b) of
state b is also defined as the mean reward available inorganize the relevant data. It is not an exact replica of
any real behavioral task. For convenience, think of it as the task following the policy, but this time including the
effect not only of the first action (U or D), but also thea maze task for a rat, with two rooms, signaled by b
(blue) or g (green) lights, out of each of which is two second action, only available here if D is selected. There
are two ways to write this value, one directly:paths. At b, the subject can go “U” (up) or “D” (down);
at g, it can go “L” (left) or “R” (right). Going U at b leads
V(b)  probability of D  probability of Lto an exit without any reward (outcome OU); going L (left)
or R (right) at g leads to exits with outcomes OL (in some  value of reward  0.5  0.3  2  0.3, (2)
cases food, in others, nothing) or OR (water or nothing).
The task is clearly instrumentally posed in that the out- and one indirectly, using the fact that the only way to
food is through state g:come for the subject is determined by its actions. The
rat is presented with the task repeatedly, always starting
V(b)  probability of D  value of state gat b, and can learn a good course of action over succes-
sive trials.  0.5  V(g)  0.3. (3)
Consider the case in which the rat is hungry and food
worth two notional units is available at OL, whereas noth- Again, by contrast, under the optimal policy, V(b)  2
also, since the rat always collects two units of rewarding is available at OR or OU. The rat has to learn to choose
D at b and then L at g in order to get the food. This is starting from b, by going through g. This points out an
important characteristic of the critic, namely that itsan example of a sequential decision problem because
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evaluations are based on the sum total reward for the tion is made available (for instance about the reward
whole task, not just the immediate, next reward. value of food to a sated rat) by which neural systems
Equation 3 contains an example self-consistency con- (notably dopamine, and parts of the nucleus accum-
dition between state values in that it specifies a quantita- bens) and at what points during the selection, or the
tive relationship between the values V(b) and V(g). The learning of the selection, of actions in such tasks.
temporal difference (TD) learning model of Pavlovian
conditioning uses such relationships to allow the critic Actions, Habits, and Incentives
to solve its own temporal credit assignment problem. In the following sections, we consider two aspects of
That is, the value V(b) of state b depends on distal re- the data on reward learning that present a significant
wards, i.e., rewards that the rat does not receive immedi- challenge to the actor-critic model, namely the Pavlov-
ately following the action U or D that it performs at b. ian specification of actions, and the differing motiva-
However, if it already knows V(g), then by measuring tional sensitivities of Pavlovian and instrumental incen-
the inconsistency between its estimates of V(b) and V(g) tive values. These falsify the simple actor-critic model
when it runs from b to g on choosing action D, it can and significantly constrain its successors. We will see
improve its estimate of V(b). The TD error, usually called that the structure of instrumental behavior changes from
, and mentioned above as the model for the phasic an early phase (during acquisition) to a later phase (fol-
activation of dopamine cells, is just this inconsistency. lowing substantial or over-training), neither of which is
In the end, the point of learning the values is to improve accurately captured by the actor-critic model.
the policy. That is, even though, for instance, neither U Pavlovian and Instrumental Actions
nor D produces any reward directly from b, D leads In the standard mapping of the actor-critic to condition-
to state g, which is valuable, and therefore it is worth ing, the critic, as a predictor of future reward and punish-
changing the policy to repeat D more frequently. Thus ment, is thought to be a model for Pavlovian condition-
the critic trains the actor. ing. However, real Pavlovian conditioning concerns
Recent neural implementations of TD models have more than just predictions, extending to the behavioral
proposed that the inconsistency between successive consequences of the predictions, namely conditioned
predictions, , is reported by a dopamine signal that responses (CRs). These CRs are reflex actions whose
controls synaptic plasticity (e.g., Montague et al., 1996; appropriateness is determined more by evolutionary
Schultz et al., 1997). A particularly compelling character- processes than individual learning. For instance, take
istic of the actor-critic model is that the very same (i.e., the case that turning on a light predicts the delivery of
dopaminergic) signal, , can simultaneously be used to reward. The Pavlovian consequence of this is approach,
learn the values, putatively thought to involve ventral i.e., the animal will move toward the light. This CR will
tegmental dopaminergic inputs to the amygdala, pre- be performed irrespective of whether or not it is appro-
frontal cortex, and nucleus accumbens, and to improve priate in terms of gaining access to the reward, an out-
the policy, with the latter potentially involving dopamin- come which is particularly striking when the experi-
ergic signals from substantia nigra to the striatum and menter arranges that food delivery depends upon
elsewhere. Hence, the actor-critic model provides a
withholding or reversing the direction of the CR. For
powerful, unifying approach to both the reward and error
example, Hershberger (1986) trained cochral chicks to
correcting functions assigned to midbrain dopamine
expect to find food in a specific food cup. He then ar-
neurons.
ranged the situation such that if they ran toward theSpecifying the actor-critic model fully requires an-
food cup, the cup receded at twice their approach speedswering a number of key questions about the informa-
whereas if they ran away from the food cup, it ap-tion associated with the predictions V(b) and V(g) and
proached them at twice their retreat speed. As such,the policy. Various versions of these questions were
the chicks had to learn to run away from the distinctivefirst posed in the context of the associative-cybernetic
food cup in order to get food. Hershberger found thatmodel of Dickinson and Balleine (1993; see also Dickin-
the chicks were unable to learn this response in orderson, 1994). For instance, is V(g) based on a direct associ-
to get the food and persisted in chasing the food away.ation between stimulus g and average reward value (0.6
They could, however, learn perfectly well to get the foodunits), between stimulus and outcome (the food and/or
when the cup moved away from them at only half ofits taste), or a more complicated representation that ties
their approach speed. Holland (1979) has conducted athis prediction to the execution of action L? Similarly,
conceptually similar experiment using hungry rats. Heis V(b) based on a direct association between stimulus
paired a light with food delivery, a preparation thatb and average reward value (0.3 units), between stimulus
quickly results in rats learning to approach the foodb and stimulus g (for instance a predictive model of the
source during the light. Holland compared performancetask), or something involving actions D and/or L? Is the
in two groups, one for which approaching the foodrepresentation of the policy, pL(g), based on a direct
source during the light resulted in the omission of theassociation between stimulus g and the action system
food, and a second that received delivery of the foodor does it depend on V(g) too or a prediction that food
at the same time as the first group without regard to theirwill be delivered? These are critical questions because,
responses. Even though the first group, the omissionfor instance, the neural structures supporting stimulus-
group, lost a considerable amount of food for doing so,value predictions (e.g., g-0.6 units), appear to differ from
Holland found that they acquired and maintained anthose supporting stimulus-stimulus predictions (e.g.,
approach response during the light to a similar degreeg-taste). Fortunately, psychological and neural data
as the second group for which there was no responsefrom sophisticated paradigms exist that help answer
these questions. These paradigms probe what informa- contingency.
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In terms of the actor-critic model, there is no justifica-
tion for the performance of CRs at all, let alone ones
that act to reduce the delivery of reward. By itself, this
is an important lacuna of the model. Various facets of
CRs are known. For instance, it has long been recog-
nized that Pavlovian CRs differ from responses gener-
ated by the US (cf. Wagner and Brandon, 1989, for dis-
cussion). Nevertheless, they are generally regarded as
reflexive in nature, reflecting both the sensory properties
of the CSs (like tones and lights) (Holland, 1977) and the
sensory and emotional or motivational properties of USs
(like food and water) (Konorski, 1967). At a neural level,
therefore, it appears likely that CRs will have much in
common with simple stimulus-response (i.e., S-R) hab- Figure 2. Model of the Pavlovian Motivational System
its. Although there is little data to indicate how such An appetitive US representation is connected with the appetitive
Pavlovian habits are encoded, it is likely that the dorsal affective system via a motivational gate (M) that is sensitive to the
specific biological impact of the US and that maintains a fixed con-striatum and striatal-like regions of the amygdala and
nection with the appetitive affective system. CSs can form connec-cerebellum along with their connections with midbrain
tions with the US or the appetitive system directly. Modeled afterand brain stem motor nuclei contribute to the perfor-
Dickinson and Balleine, 2002.
mance of these simple responses (Holland, 1993; Gluck
et al., 2001).
Although Pavlovian actions can be highly adaptive between the performance of an action (such as pressing
(e.g., Hollis et al., 1997), the fact their performance can a lever) and its consequences (such as food) is changed,
be less than appropriate in a changing environment the performance of the action changes appropriately.
makes it necessary that animals be able to acquire new Hungry rats will, for example, reduce their performance
behavioral strategies in order to get essential commodi- of actions as the contingent relation between the action,
ties. This well-documented capacity is usually studied and the delivery of a specific food outcome is reduced
within the free-operant or instrumental conditioning pro- (Hammond, 1980; Dickinson and Mulatero, 1989; Ball-
cedure; in the paradigm case, a hungry rat can be trained eine and Dickinson, 1998). Indeed, they will reduce their
to press a freely available lever to gain access to food performance even more rapidly if a negative relationship
reward. The key questions for us are exactly what is is arranged, e.g., if performing the action leads to the
learned about the action and the outcome (e.g., the omission of an otherwise available food reward (Davis
food), and whether, as in the actor-critic, this learning and Bitterman, 1971; Dickinson et al., 1998). Omission
depends at all on Pavlovian predictions? Considerable schedules provide, therefore, a direct means of assessing
evidence suggests that at least during acquisition, the the relative degree of Pavlovian and instrumental control
performance of instrumental actions depends crucially
over behavior (cf. Dickinson and Balleine, 1993).
on encoding the relationship between the action and its
Interestingly, when instrumental actions are over-
consequences or outcome (i.e., the instrumental contin-
trained, they no longer appear to adjust to the imposition
gency; see Dickinson and Balleine, 1993, 1994; Colwill
of an omission contingency (Dickinson et al., 1998). Thisand Rescorla, 1986, for reviews). The extent to which
has been taken as evidence that a simple sensory-motorthis dependence is true after, as well as during, learning
or S-R habit has been formed, which then acts in essen-bears importantly on the way that policies such as pL(g) tially the same manner as a Pavlovian conditioned re-are represented and is a major topic in the section of
sponse. This shift in the associative structure controllingthis paper on Instrumental Values. Note, however, that
instrumental performance provides some very strongin any given situation, it is not necessarily immediately
constraints on models by showing how the informationapparent whether the performance of a candidate action
determining policies such as pL(g) changes over time.is controlled by an instrumental or a Pavlovian contin-
Pavlovian Valuesgency, and tests have to be conducted to establish this.
Most dopaminergic models of the critic assume thatTo illustrate this point, consider the example presented
Pavlovian CRs, such as approach to a food source, offerin Figure 1. A hypothetical rat might be observed to
a behavioral report of Pavlovian values like V(b) and V(g).perform D more than U in the presence of the state
Although Pavlovian CRs are not controlled by the CR-cue b. But this could be due either to the relationship
US contingency, their performance is directly sensitivebetween D and g (the instrumental contingency) or to
to the level of motivation of the subjects, such asthe relationship between b and g such that b elicits D
whether or not they are hungry. This motivational orindependently of D’s relationship to g (the Pavlovian
affective control argues against simple realizations ofcontingency), just like the chicks’ prediction of food
the critic in which there is one set of weights or parame-produces an approach response independently of the
ters (whatever their neural realization) mapping fromconsequence of that response for the delivery of the
stimulus representations (i.e., units whose activities arefood. Although in this situation, it makes little difference
determined by the stimuli shown to the subject) to thewith respect to the transition to g whether a Pavlovian
values. Rather, it supports something more like the fun-or an instrumental contingency controls the perfor-
damentally richer model of Figure 2 (Dickinson and Ball-mance of D, it is clear that it will have direct implications
eine, 2002).for anticipating the neural structures that control D.
In instrumental conditioning, when the relationship Dickinson and Balleine (2002) argue that there are two
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different kinds of connections between stimuli and the responding to second-order cues has been reported to
be insensitive to the effects of a shift in motivation.appetitive and aversive affective structures that control
performance of CRs: one direct and one indirect via a Under these conditions, V(b) may be maintained by the
direct pathway to the affective system shown in Figure 2.connection between the CS and sensory properties of
the US. Evidence for the direct connection between CSs, Interestingly, representations of sensory events in the
primate orbitofrontal cortex have been argued to un-and an appetitive system is provided by demonstrations
of transreinforcer blocking. That is, in rats made both dergo remodeling based on their motivational signifi-
cance; the responsiveness of neurons in this region sen-hungry and thirsty, a CS paired with food can subse-
quently block the acquisition of conditioned responses sitive to food or water delivery, as well as to signals
that predict the delivery of these commodities has beento a second CS when both CSs are presented in com-
pound and reinforced with water (Ganesan and Pearce, found to be a direct function of the animal’s motivational
state (e.g., of their degree of food or water deprivation;198). A standard interpretation of blocking is that the
first stimulus makes an accurate prediction, leaving cf. Rolls, 1989, 2000a). It appears that in other structures
involved in ascribing affective significance to CSs, suchnothing for the second stimulus to predict. For this to
hold when the reinforcer is changed across phases, as the insular cortex and the amygdala, neuronal re-
sponsiveness is not gated by motivational state (Yaxleyhowever, it must be true that the affective value of a CS
can be divorced from the particular US that originally et al., 1988; Rolls et al., 1990; Rolls, 2000b), suggesting
that these areas may be involved in the direct pathwayestablished that value, as in the direct pathway. There
is, however, equally good evidence for the indirect con- associating CSs to the appetitive system.
Since the tasks in which the activity of dopamine cellsnection, that is, stimulus-stimulus (stimulus substitution)
links between CSs and USs that allow CSs to activate the has been recorded (Schultz, 1998) have not involved
motivational manipulations, we do not know the behav-appetitive system transitively. Furthermore, the classic
reports of the sensitivity of CRs to shifts in motivation ior of the prediction error signal for Pavlovian rewards
in these cases. It has been suggested that dopamine is(DeBold et al., 1965; Mitchell and Gormezano, 1970;
reviewed by Dickinson and Balleine, 2002) suggest that preferentially involved in the direct pathway of Figure 2.
For instance, Berridge and his colleagues (see Berridge,the impact of this CS-US association on performance
can depend on the motivational state of the subject. As 2001) have implicated dopamine in the preparatory
(wanting) aspects of appetitive conditioning and havea consequence, motivational states such as hunger and
thirst have been argued to threshold or gate (i.e., M in shown its irrelevance for, at least, those consummatory
appetitive orofacial reactions elicited by the direct infu-Figure 2) connections between the sensory US repre-
sentation and the appetitive system and, therefore, to sion of foods and fluids. Berridge (2001) and Balleine
and Dickinson (1998) have specifically identified the gus-modulate the indirect link from CSs to the appetitive
system. tatory region of the insular cortex and its efferents to
the amygdala as mediating important aspects of thisIn this model, the gate is US specific, so that, for
instance, it is hydration that modulates fluid representa- latter (i.e., liking) aspect of food rewards based on the
finding that damage to this region appears to generatetions and nutritional needs that modulate food represen-
tations. Indeed, studies of specific hungers suggest that a form of taste agnosia (e.g., Braun, 1990).
Instrumental ValuesUS gating may be even more specific than a simple
hunger-thirst distinction. For example, Davidson et al. Having established an observational difference between
Pavlovian and instrumental actions and a sensitive(1997) exposed food-deprived rats to pairings of one
CS with a carbohydrate US, sucrose pellets, and another mechanism for assessing Pavlovian values, we might
seem to be in a good position to assess the key claimwith a fat US, peanut oil, before returning the animals
to the nondeprived state for testing. Prior to this test, of the actor-critic model by asking how well matched to
the data is a learning scheme that uses a dopaminergicone group was placed in a glucoprivic state (i.e., short
of sugar), whereas a lipoprivic state (i.e., short of fat) Pavlovian critic to train an instrumental actor. Unfortu-
nately, this turns out to be a rather complicated ques-was induced in another group. Importantly, the rats in
the lipoprivic state showed more magazine approach tion. Broadly speaking, the model does not fare well
except potentially in the case of conditioned reinforce-during the peanut oil CS than during the sucrose CS,
whereas the reverse pattern was observed in rats in the ment, for which some critical experiments have yet to
be performed.glucoprivic state. This specificity implies that there must
be separate US gating for these two states and their rele- First, consistent with the actor-critic, signals (like g in
Figure 1) associated with reward can act as conditionedvant reinforcers. Another example of this specificity is salt
seeking under a sodium appetite (e.g., Berridge and reinforcers of actions. It has long been known that rats
and other animals will acquire actions like lever pressingSchulkin, 1989; Fudim, 1978; see also Krieckhaus, 1970).
We can now see how the values assigned to state when those actions are followed by a cue previously
associated with primary reward (e.g., food; see Mackin-cues in Figure 1 should be affected by this Pavlovian
incentive process. To the extent that the indirect g-US tosh, 1974, for review). Furthermore, it is generally ac-
cepted that although the acquisition of responses forpathway of Figure 2 applies, the value V(g) of state g
will be dependent on the motivational control of the g-OL such conditioned reinforcers depends upon the basolat-
eral amygdala, the reinforcement signal appears to relyassociation and so will be high, provided the hypotheti-
cal rat is hungry, and low when it is satiated. The value on a Pavlovian incentive process involving dopaminer-
gic activity in the ventral striatum (Cador et al., 1989;V(b) of state b depends partly on a second order contin-
gency, since b is followed by g rather than directly by Taylor and Robbins, 1984). Unfortunately, because of
the control conditions conventionally employed, it is notreward. Under certain conditions (e.g., Rescorla, 1982),
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yet known whether these actions are under Pavlovian levers and chains but continued to produce both re-
sponses at an equivalent rate. If, however, the rats wereor instrumental control. It is common, for example, to
compare responding on a lever that delivers a stimulus allowed merely to consume the liquid sucrose and dry
pellet rewards when thirsty prior to the choice test, theypaired with reward to performance on another lever that
delivers a stimulus that has not been paired with reward. subsequently displayed a strong preference for the ac-
tion that, in training, had previously delivered the liquidHowever, since the levers are usually spatially sepa-
rated, a Pavlovian approach to the location of the lever sucrose. Although Pavlovian responses have been
found to be directly sensitive to this shift (e.g., Dickinsondelivering the paired stimulus would be as effective in
causing that lever to be favored as choice based on the and Dawson, 1987), the shift to water deprivation had
no impact on instrumental performance until the ratsencoded action-outcome contingency.
Second, consider the representation of a policy such had been allowed to experience the effect of the shift
on the incentive value of the instrumental outcome. Theas pL(g). A standard simple actor scheme treats this as a
learned stimulus-response mapping from g to an action latter training, involving consummatory contact with the
instrumental outcome after a shift in primary motivation,selection system (often considered to involve the dorso-
lateral striatum and, particularly, on its large matrix com- is called incentive learning (see Dickinson and Balleine,
1994; Balleine, 2001, for reviews).partment to which most sensory and motor fibers pro-
ject; e.g., Gerfen, 1985; Graybiel et al., 1994). This is The two parts of this finding jointly pose a complicated
problem for actor-critic models. The simple actor-critictoo simplistic, both during the acquisition and after the
overtraining of an instrumental action. The problem for is happily insensitive to changes in motivational state.
That incentive learning about the outcomes can affectany theory of instrumental acquisition formulated in
terms of S-R association is that if, for instance, the food a subsequent choice of action suggests the involvement
of a forward model to allow information about an out-reward is devalued by independently conditioning a
taste aversion to it, then evidence suggests that the rat come to control a determining action via a prediction.
Indeed, Balleine (2001) argues in general for this sort ofwill refuse to go L at g when returned to the task. This
implies that pL(g) depends directly on the value of out- indirect connection between instrumental actions and
motivational structures as the basis for the primary rep-come that is encoded as a consequence of the action
and not on the relationship between stimulus g and resentation of the hedonic properties of the instrumental
outcome. However, the evaluation of the outcome can-response L. Indeed, this dependence is often taken as
the mark of a truly instrumental action (e.g., Dickinson not be the Pavlovian evaluation that the actor-critic
would have assumed since Pavlovian values do not re-and Balleine, 1993, 1995). In modeling terms, it suggests
that a forward model (e.g., Sutton and Pinette, 1985; quire incentive learning to come under motivational con-
trol (cf. Balleine, 1992, 2001).Dayan, 1993; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000), which
predicts the consequences of actions at states, must Incentive learning is very general. For example, rats
trained to lever press for food when food deprived doplay a role in specifying the policies. One might hope
that the simple actor would be better able to account not immediately reduce their performance on the lever
when they are suddenly shifted to an undeprived state.for the end point of instrumental conditioning, by which
time, as we have discussed, actions appear to become Nor do they increase their performance immediately if
they are trained undeprived and are suddenly given astimulus-response habits dependent on the stimulus g
and the motivational state of the animal (Dickinson et test on the levers when food deprived. In both cases,
rats only modify their instrumental performance afteral.,1995). However, because it fails to accommodate
Pavlovian actions, the standard actor-critic lacks a way they have been allowed the opportunity to consume
the instrumental outcome in the new motivational statefor Pavlovian values to control the execution of habits
(but see the discussion of Pavlovian-instrumental trans- (Balleine, 1992). Nor is this effect confined to shifts be-
tween hunger and thirst and hunger and satiety. It hasfer below) and would, contrary to the data (Dickinson
et al., 1998), suggest that such habits would be readily also been observed after increases and decreases in
water deprivation (Lopez et al., 1992; Lopez and Par-unlearned through omission schedules.
Third and most critical for the actor-critic scheme of edes-Olay, 1999), devaluation by taste aversion proce-
dures (Balleine and Dickinson, 1991, 1992), changes inusing Pavlovian values to control instrumental learning,
is the considerable evidence suggesting that the instru- outcome value mediated by drug states (Balleine et al.,
1994), and even following changes in the value of ther-mental incentive process conforms to different rules
than Pavlovian incentives and has a different neural ba- moregulatory (Hendersen and Graham, 1979) and sexual
rewards (Everitt and Stacey, 1987). Nevertheless, thesis (Balleine, 2001; Corbit et al., 2001). Consider the
hypothetical rat in Figure 1 in a slightly different case in neural processes that support incentive learning are not
well understood at present, although Balleine and Dick-which food is available at OL and water at OR . We know
from the discussion in the Pavlovian Values section that inson (2000) have presented evidence to suggest that
in instrumental conditioning, the insular cortex is in-the Pavlovian value of g has a gated dependence on
motivational state and so will change appropriately as volved in the retrieval of the incentive value of foods.
At a systems level, afferents from the insular cortex tothe animal is sated for food, water, or both. However,
the same turns out not be true for truly instrumental the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, together with
connections between these latter structures, may pro-actions. Dickinson and Dawson (1988) trained rats to
lever press and chain pull with one action, earning ac- vide the essential circuit mediating learning about
changes in the rewarding impact of instrumental out-cess to liquid sucrose with one and the other to dry
food pellets. When subsequently made thirsty, the rats comes following shifts in primary motivation. To the ex-
tent that that is true, connections between these struc-did not immediately modify their performance on the
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tures and cortico-striatal circuits involving the prelimbic devaluation of the instrumental outcome. In one study,
area, the nucleus accumbens core, and pallidal output for example, peripheral administration of either the D2
from the basal ganglia may provide the means by which antagonist pimozide or the D1, D2 antagonist -flupen-
these changes in reward act to affect instrumental per- thixol were found to induce both a dose-dependent de-
formance (cf. Balleine and Dickinson, 1998, for dis- crease in instrumental lever pressing for food and to
cussion). attenuate the excitatory effects of a Pavlovian CS for
We have thus argued that instrumental and Pavlovian food on instrumental performance. Nevertheless, nei-
values are separately represented and that dopamine ther drug was found to influence the instrumental deval-
plays an important role in the direct ascription of Pavlov- uation effect induced by a shift from a food deprived to
ian values to CSs. We also know that dopamine plays a nondeprived state (Dickinson et al., 2000). Dickinson
an important role in conditioned reinforcement, although et al. concluded that the changes in the incentive value
it is not yet clear whether or not conditioned reinforce- of the instrumental outcome induced by devaluation
ment involves instrumental conditioning. Strikingly, do- treatments are mediated by a different process to that
pamine seems not to play a role in representing the sort engaged by excitatory Pavlovian cues; whereas the lat-
of instrumental values involved in incentive learning. ter appears to be dopamine dependent, the former does
However, this independence is confusingly masked by not.
a dopamine-dependent interaction between Pavlovian The potentiation of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer in-
and instrumental conditioning called Pavlovian-instru- duced by infusions of amphetamine into the accumbens
mental transfer. shell suggests that this region of the accumbens may
It is well documented that Pavlovian cues can exert critically mediate the excitatory effects of Pavlovian
an excitatory effect on instrumental performance. In hu- cues on instrumental performance without affecting out-
mans, for example, cues associated with drugs of abuse, come devaluation. Direct evidence for this claim comes
in addition to inducing a strong craving for the specific from a recent series of studies by Corbit et al. (2001).
drug with which they are associated, produce a rapid In this series, selective lesions of the accumbens shell
and selective increase in actions through which addicts were found to abolish the selective transfer effects pro-
seek access to the drug and, even after long periods of duced when a CS is paired with the same reinforcer as
abstinence, reliably precipitate relapse to a drug-taking that earned by the instrumental action. Nevertheless,
habit (O’Brien et al., 1998) In rats, this phenomenon has no effect of this lesion was found on the sensitivity of rats
been studied using several different approaches. For to selective devaluation of the instrumental outcome by
example, consider training a rat separately that a tone a specific satiety treatment. Corbit et al. (2001) com-
CS is associated with water, whereas pressing a lever pared the impact of shell lesions with lesions made of
leads to food. If the rat is subsequently made thirsty, the accumbens core. Importantly, lesions of the core
then playing the tone while it is pressing the lever results were found to have no influence on the selective transfer
in an increase in performance on the lever. This is the effect abolished by the shell lesions but had a profound
basic Pavlovian-instrumental transfer effect (cf. Ball- effect on the sensitivity of rats to the selective devalua-
eine, 1994). More impressive still is evidence for selec- tion of the instrumental outcome. Corbit et al.’s (2001)
tive effects of Pavlovian CSs; for example, Colwill and study provides evidence, therefore, of a double dissoci-
Rescorla (1988) and Colwill and Motzkin (1994) have ation between the impact of shell and core lesions on
reported that CSs that signal the same reinforcer as that Pavlovian transfer and instrumental devaluation effects,
earned by an instrumental action (i.e., if the tone was suggesting that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive
associated with food rather than water) facilitate the processes involve distinct neural systems.
performance of that action but have no effect on the
performance of actions trained with a different reinforcer
The New Modelto that signaled by the CS.
Before outlining the new model designed to accommo-Considerable evidence suggests that like conditioned
date these findings, it is worth noting again how unex-reinforcement, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer involves
pected they are from the perspective of methods forthe ventral striatum (de Borchgrave et al., 2002; Balleine
learning optimal actions. The Pavlovian system is asso-and Killcross, 1994) and, more specifically, dopaminer-
ciated with an extremely rigid (and, indeed, often mal-gic activity in the nucleus accumbens (e.g., Wyvell and
adaptive) scheme for action choice. Stimuli associatedBerridge, 2000, 2001; Dickinson et al., 2000). For in-
with appetitive USs elicit approach-like behavior (as instance, the impact of Pavlovian cues on instrumental
the pecking of the food- or water-predicting lit key inperformance is strongly affected by negative effects on
pigeon autoshaping) whether or not (as in omissionstriatal DA (such as lesions) (Berridge and Robinson,
schedules) this behavior is adaptive or even barely moti-1998), or the administration of pimozide (Pecina et al.,
vationally appropriate. However, coupled with this sys-1997), or the facilitation of DA transmission by either
tem for choosing actions is a highly sophisticatedmicroinjection of amphetamine into the shell region of
method for evaluating the motivational relevance of USsthe nucleus accumbens (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000), or
and their predictors, which instantly reevaluates themamphetamine-induced sensitization (Wyvell and Ber-
in the light of the animal’s multidimensional needs forridge, 2001).
water, food, salt, lipids, and the like.Critically, two lines of evidence argue that this path-
The instrumental system allows much greater flexibil-way is not associated with instrumental values. First,
ity in the choice of actions, permitting the acquisitiontreatments that modify the effectiveness of Pavlovian
of relatively arbitrary chains of responses. However, itcues on instrumental performance have no detectable
effect on the sensitivity of instrumental performance to suffers from an incentive system that seems to lack the
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capacity for instant reevaluation of rewarding events in of the actions and when faced with a choice, that the
actions compete according to their advantages. Thethe light of shifts in the current motivational state.
Rather, motivational states seem to act merely as part neural substrate for this competition is not clear, al-
though cortico-dorsal striato-thalamo-cortical loopsof the representational context for specifying values,
and only through learning (notably incentive learning) have been argued to play an important role (Reynolds
et al., 2001).can motivational state be tied to instrumental values.
Of course, this opportunity to establish values by learn- As the choice of actions at a state changes, the value
of that state and the advantages of all the actions ating can be seen as another way in which the instrumental
system is more flexible than the Pavlovian system in its that state change too. At the optimal policy for the maze
in Figure 1 for which pU(b)  0, pD(b)  1, pL(g)  1,ability to adapt to changes in environmental constraints.
Nevertheless, a Pavlovian appetitive conditioned stimu- pR(g) 0, and the Q value QD(b) 2, since the rat always
chooses correctly at g, and so the advantage AD(b) lus (e.g., a light that predicts food to a hungry animal)
can act as conditioned reinforcer, although, in this situa- 2 2 0. Correctly (and importantly) the optimal action
D has no advantage over the average value of all actionstion, it is possible that responding is controlled by the
Pavlovian, rather than the instrumental, contingency. when it is itself always chosen at b.
In the model, values are learned using the familiar,In this section, we sketch the outline of a new account
(Dayan, 2002) designed in the light of these data and phasic prediction error signal  reported by dopamine
(Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz,Dickinson and Balleine’s (1993) associative-cybernetic
model. It relates Dickinson and Balleine’s (2002) Konor- 1998). That is, the model for learning V(b) and V(g) is
exactly as before. The value of this same prediction errorskian model of Pavlovian motivation shown in Figure 2
to the dopamine data and formalizes a model of instru- signal following execution of an action is actually the
target for the advantage of that action. Thus, the errormental action choice that can be related to incentive
learning. The most complex aspects of the model come in the advantage AD(b) is
from the existence of two different predictive models:
A    AD (b), (5)one for Pavlovian conditioning seen in the CS-US asso-
ciation in Figure 2, and one for instrumental conditioning. based on the TD prediction error  that arises after action
There is also a complex interplay between hard-wired D is taken at state b. The advantage error signal A can
values (as in the motivational gate M in Figure 2) and be used to alter synaptic weights, which are responsible
learned or plastic values. for AD(b).
Formally, the new model, like the actor-critic, consid- We have so far described the key components of the
ers predictions [such as V(b)] of the long-run future re- model. The next task is to map them onto the neural
wards starting from each state and following a policy. and psychological data described above. The model
Unlike the actor-critic, it evaluates actions according adopts Dickinson and Balleine’s (2002) scheme for Pav-
to quantities called their advantages (Baird, 1993). The lovian evaluation (as shown in Figure 2), suggesting that
advantage of performing an action at a state is the differ- a key output from the appetitive system is the dopamin-
ence between two long-term rewards: one particular to ergic temporal difference prediction error , which exerts
the action, called its Q value (Watkins, 1989), the other Pavlovian motivational control over actions as well as
averaging over all actions (the regular value of the state). training the values. This captures the neurophysiological
For instance, the advantage of action D at state b is: data on the activity of the dopamine system (which have
hitherto not involved motivational manipulations) andAD (b)  QD (b)  V(b), (4) is also consistent with the other motivational effects
discussed in the previous section. The model assumeswhere QD(b) is the expected reward if the rat goes D at
b and then follows its normal policy from the state at that Pavlovian-instrumental transfer is based on the do-
paminergic output of this system (likely to the shell ofwhich it arrives, and V(b) is the regular prediction of long
run future reward from b. For the policy shown in Figure the accumbens) and that the same signal may control
the vigor with which Pavlovian conditioned responses1, QD(b)  0.6 is just the value V(g), since choosing D at
state b leads the rat to state g. This implies that the are emitted. The nature of the direct associative link
between CSs and USs and also between CSs and otheradvantage of action D at b is AD(b)  0.6  0.3  0.3.
Conversely, the advantage of action U at b is AU(b)  CSs, as in other Pavlovian paradigms such as sensory
preconditioning (Suri and Schultz, 2001), is not com-0  0.3  0.3, since QU(b)  0. The advantages are
so named because they measure how much better pletely specified. Certainly some form of stimulus-sub-
stitution is likely to play an important role. As suggested[AD(b)  0] or worse [AU(b)  0] an action is than the
state’s value, V(b), which comes from averaging across by Figure 2, the motivational predictions of CSs (the CS-
appetitive pathway) are in a form of learning competitionall actions at b.
Actions with large, positive advantages are better than with the predictions based on stimulus substitution (CS-
USap-M-appetitive). The larger the contribution of thethe actions specified by the current policy and should
be favored. Actions with large negative advantages are latter to the final appetitive prediction of the CS, the
more the CS will be subject to instant motivational ma-poor and should be disdained. For the policy in Figure
1, this suggests that the animal would do better by nipulations, for instance, allowing a light that predicts
that food will immediately follow might lose its apparentchoosing action D at b more frequently than action U,
which is clearly true. This process by which action conditioning power if the animal is sated.
This dopaminergic prediction error signal might con-choice gets better is a form of policy improvement. In
general, we assume that the rat learns the advantages trol the energy level applied to a Pavlovian habit but to
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of the scheme, make the action D have a small cost
(of0.5 units). Figure 3A shows the development of the
advantages of U and D over learning. Action D starts
looking worse because it has a greater immediate cost;
its advantage increases as the worth of D grows greater
than the mean value of b and then goes to 0 (the birth
of the habit) as the subject learns to choose it every
time. The small inset graph shows how the probability
of choosing D grows toward one over trials. For compari-
son, the solid line in Figure 3B shows the value compo-
nent V(b) of state b. While actions are still under instru-
mental control [here, up until around trial 100, when
Figure 3. The New Model AD(b) → 0], they can compete according to their advan-
(A) Development across trials of the advantages of D and U at state tages. One natural assumption is that there is a baseline
b in a case in which the animal has already been shaped to go L for the advantages, and as the advantage of an action
at state g and D costs a nominal 0.5 units. The inset graph shows
dips below that baseline, that action is removed fromthe probability of choosing to go D at b.
the competition. The dashed line in Figure 3B (labeled(B) The development of the value V(b) of state b (solid line), which
forward model) shows the component of V(b) that de-assumes responsibility for the control of going D once the action
has become a habit (i.e., once the associated advantage is 0). The rives from the CS-USap-M-appetitive connection of Fig-
dashed line shows the component of the value that comes from a ure 2; the remainder depends directly on plastic connec-
predictive or forward model. tions between the CS and the appetitive system. This
former component is subject to instant devaluation as
in the motivational experiments.which habit should it be applied? Here, as in Dickinson
The incentive learning experiments show that a pre-and Balleine (2002), we make another assumption: that
dictive model plays a critical role in instrumental evalua-USs such as food and water are directly associated with
tion. Various experiments suggest that the cortical areasappropriate consummatory habits such as eating and
associated with taste processing are substrates for in-drinking and that pure motivational predictions, i.e., pre-
centive learning. One way to think of these is rather likedictions of future reward or future punishment, are asso-
the hard-wired system for Pavlovian motivation. Actionsciated with hard-wired preparatory habits such as ap-
predicted to lead to good-tasting substances are auto-proach or withdrawal. These habits extend by stimulus
matically awarded high advantages; those leading tosubstitution to CSs such as lights and tones with which
bad-tasting ones are automatically awarded low advan-the USs are associated, albeit with some changes asso-
tages. If the taste changes through learning (for instanceciated both with the different sensory impact of the CSs
in the reexposure condition of a food aversion experi-and their relative abilities to activate the US representa-
ment), then this has an immediate impact on the advan-tions.
tage of the associated action. As with the Pavlovian
Next, the instrumental action selection mechanism,
system, the actual advantages result from the combina-
which allows learning of arbitrary action sequences for
tion of the output of this route with that of a convention-
future reward, must provide a means by which stimulus-
ally plastic route. From the data at the end of the section
response habits can be born from actions. In the exam- entitled Instrumental Values, the core of the accumbens
ple of Figure 1, for instance, an action selection system may be an important player in determining the interac-
in which the choice must be made between simultane- tion of instrumental values with the instrumental action-
ously appropriate possibilities U and D at b, under instru- outcome contingency (Corbit et al., 2001).
mental motivational control, must, over the course of Unfortunately, because of the tasks, the data do not
learning, give rise to a habit scheme in which a single settle the issue as to exactly what the animals are pre-
course of action (D) is appropriate. In the habit scheme, dicting and under what conditions. In fact, there is an
evidence suggests that the only control that remains is extreme model of instrumental action choice that is
the degree of Pavlovian motivation [V(b)] that it enjoys purely cognitive (Dickinson, 1997), using only the predic-
(cf. Dickinson et al., 1995). tions of actual outcomes based on a full model of the
The new model captures this using the advantages. action-state-outcome contingencies of the world. Since
As discussed, over the course of policy improvement, schedules involving many sequential choices suffer
the advantage of a suboptimal action (e.g., U) becomes from curses of dimensionality, i.e., an explosion in the
negative [AU(b) →2] and of an optimal action (D) tends size of the relationship between action and outcome
to 0. The latter offers a natural model of the transi- (think of the complexity of trying to look multiple moves
tion from instrumental action selection to a stimulus- ahead in chess, for instance), this extreme method of
response habit. Once the advantage of the optimal ac- action choice is only effective in very small domains.
tion has become 0, the only remaining control at a state Dynamic programming avoids this curse of dimensional-
becomes the Pavlovian prediction [V(b)] associated with ity by using value functions as intermediate quantities.
that state, i.e., the Pavlovian motivational system takes These functions, at the other extreme, eliminate the
over. complexity in action choice by focusing exclusively on
Figures 3A and 3B show two aspects of instrumental motivational value, divorced from its basis in the set of
conditioning at state b in the task of Figure 1. Here, we choices between actions. There is a variety of possibili-
have assumed that the subject has already been shaped ties between these two extremes in which world models
play a greater or lesser role. The theoretical reinforce-to choose L at g, but, to show off the full characteristics
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ment learning community has yet to resolve the issues how animals choose (and learn to choose, Krebs et al.,
1978) to balance exploration and exploitation is a richas to the regimes in which different forms of world model
field of investigation (see, for instance, Montague andare most obviously necessary (Kearns and Singh, 1999).
Berns, 2002). It has been suggested that activity of theAs mentioned, the neural substrate of the instrumental
dopamine system that is not associated with predictionactor is not completely clear. There are general reasons
errors for reward might be associated with ensuringto suppose that the dopaminergic pathway from the
appropriate exploration (Suri and Schultz, 1999; Suri,substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) to the dorsal stria-
2002; Kakade and Dayan, 2001, 2002). It is also possibletum might report the error in the current advantage error
that slower, but more tonic, activation of dopamine neu-of an action at a state, and cortico-striato-thalamo-corti-
rons is responsible for rather different effects (e.g., How-cal loops might be responsible for action competition.
land et al., 2002), perhaps those associated with biasingHowever, there is not yet the evidence to pin down even
the animal toward specific places or contexts or towardwhether the substrate for choosing a response changes
certain strategies in instrumental conditioning. Differentas the response goes from being under instrumental to
populations of dopamine receptors in the striatum mayPavlovian control.
contribute to quite different functions, particularly given
the suggestion that D1/D4 receptors regulate activity inDiscussion
the direct striato-nigra pathway, whereas D2/D3 recep-Experiments pose a critical challenge to our understand-
tors regulate activity in the indirect pathway, projectinging of the psychological and neural implementation of
to the substantia nigra via the pallidum and subthalamicreinforcement learning, suggesting the importance of
nucleus (Gerfen, 1992; Gerfen et al., 1990). It likely thattwo different sorts of motivation in controlling behavior
these different populations of dopamine receptors con-and arguing against the simple actor-critic scheme that
tribute to quite distinct functions.has hitherto generally been assumed. The experiments
The circuitry that mediates the interactions betweenalso place significant emphasis on habits, the objects
Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning is of consider-of Pavlovian motivation, which are orphaned in the previ-
able interest. Although these forms of learning may in-ous scheme.
volve distinct systems and may even be subserved byWe adopted Dickinson and Balleine’s (2002) charac-
quite distinct learning rules, clearly, Pavlovian cues canterization of Pavlovian motivation, incorporating a hard-
exert an excitatory effect upon instrumental perfor-wired, stimulus substitution-sensitive route for the eval-
mance. Generally, the associative strength of a CS pre-uation of stimuli and states, which competes with a
dicts its impact on instrumental performance (Rescorlaplastic route putatively operating through the amygdala
and Solomon, 1967; Rescorla, 1968) and, as such, Pav-and the orbitofrontal cortex. One key output of this
lovian-instrumental transfer appears to offer the mostmodel, reported by dopaminergic activity, is the tempo-
direct evidence (and, arguably, the best model) of aral difference prediction error for future reward. This,
direct connection between reflexive and goal-directedacting via the shell (and possibly also the core) of the
learning systems. Currently, evidence suggests that thenucleus accumbens, is suggested as the mechanism
point of interaction is likely to involve connections be-
underlying the Pavlovian control of habits.
tween the shell and core of the nucleus accumbens.
We also considered advantages as a suitable way
Thus, for example, in a recent, unpublished study, Corbit
of modeling the transition from the selection between
and Balleine found that asymmetrical AMPA lesions of
multiple, simultaneously appropriate actions under in- shell and core abolish transfer, suggesting that the criti-
strumental control, to the Pavlovian-based motivation cal interaction is between AMPA-related processes in
of just a single action. One component of the advantage these structures. Van Dongen et al. (2001, Soc. Neurosci.
must be dependent on a forward or predictive model, Abstr.) has recently described direct and reciprocal pro-
so that instrumental action choice can be sensitive to jections from shell to core, and Haber et al. (2000) have
reexposure as in incentive learning. described spiralling interactions between the striatum
A more subtle message of these studies is the com- and midbrain dopamine neurons that support, for exam-
plexity of the learning phenomena and the neural sub- ple, a shell-VTA-core interaction. In this case, shell pro-
strates involved. Sequential decision problems involving jection neurons could exert quite direct control over
chains of actions, as in Figure 1, are highly revealing plasticity in the accumbens core. It may be that a struc-
because motivational and other manipulations readily ture downstream from shell and core is the site of inte-
lay bare the extent to which actions are chosen and gration. The ventral pallidum is a reasonable possibility
values are specified based on prewired direct and indi- in this regard, particularly given that the GABA projec-
rect (i.e., forward-model) links between CSs and USs tion neurons from the striatum to the pallidum appear
and between actions and their associated discriminative to be predominantly controlled by an AMPA-related pro-
CSs and outcome USs. The differing sensitivities discov- cess (Byrnes et al., 1997).
ered under the heading of incentive learning show the Various features of instrumental and Pavlovian condi-
variegated roles played by different parts of the brain tioning have yet to be fully integrated into the current
involved in appetitive evaluation. approach. With respect to Pavlovian processes, we have
The main theoretical problem left concerns explor- concentrated almost exclusively on excitatory appeti-
atory behavior and the trade-off between exploring to tive conditioning. Inhibitory and aversive conditioning
gain new information about an environment and ex- (and even extinction of Palovian excitors) pose a further
ploiting existing knowledge in order to get reward. Al- set of important concerns. Unfortunately, there is just
though formal solutions to this problem are well known, as little agreement about the neural underpinnings of
aversive conditioning as there is of appetitive condition-they are highly computationally challenging. Studying
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ing. One strongly favored possibility is that there is af- A further set of experiments that would be most helpful
fective opponency (Solomon and Corbit, 1974; Grossberg, for specifying the model more fully concern the truly
1988), the dynamics of which offer quite powerful ac- instrumental status of conditioned reinforcement and
counts of various experimental phenomena. Based on its role in sequential decision making. Determining
pharmacological, behavioral, anatomical, and physio- whether or not (Pavlovian) conditioned reinforcers can
logical data, it has been suggested (e.g., Deakin, 1983; support truly instrumental behaviors is long overdue.
Deakin and Graeff, 1991; Daw et al., 2002) that serotonin If they can, then this implies a somewhat more direct
released by neurons whose cell bodies live in the dorsal relationship between Pavlovian and instrumental moti-
raphe nucleus acts as an aversive opponent to dopa- vational control than strict readings of recent theories
mine. Different timescales may be involved, with the would suggest and poses an interesting problem about
phasic component of the serotonin signal reporting on the neural realization of these two phenomena. The role
aversive events, but with its tonic component reporting of accumbens dopamine in this also merits further ex-
on long-run average reward. At present, there is limited ploration.
direct evidence for such a proposition, although there Sequential decision problems form an important com-
is good evidence from behavioral studies to support the putational class, and the substantial theories of dynamic
existence of an aversive motivational system standing programming (also employed in studies of optimal forag-
in a mutually inhibitory relationship with the appetitive ing, Mangel and Clark, 1988) are devoted to their solu-
system of Figure 2 (cf. Dickinson and Balleine, 2002). tion. It is not practical even for computers to perform
For example, conditioned inhibitors of aversive USs can extensive ‘cognitive’ action choice (called forward-
block appetitive conditioning to CSs that would other- chaining) in the contemplation of appropriate actions
wise predict reward (e.g., Dickinson and Dearing, 1979), at a particular state in a complex sequential decision
suggesting that there must be some connection be- problem. Reinforcement learning comprises one family
tween appetitive and aversive motivational centers. of methods for performing dynamic programming, using
With respect to instrumental conditioning, the sugges- the values of states as a form of cache for the reward
tion that dopamine plays a limited role in changes in consequences of the actions subsequent to those
the value of the instrumental outcome accomplished by states. The activity of dopamine cells in simple versions
incentive learning raises the question not only of what of such tasks suggests that monkeys indeed acquire
neural systems, but also what neurotransmitter systems, such values but does not indicate how they are repre-
might generally support this learning and hedonic evalu- sented and how they might be integrated with the sort
ation. In this regard, the endogenous opiate system of more limited forward models that are implied by some
stands out as a promising candidate. There is abundant of the experiments on incentive learning. It would be
evidence that animals find exogenous opiates rewarding interesting (and only a small extension to existing work)
and, although some evidence has implicated VTA dopa- to pose stochastic sequential decision problems (called
mine activity in these effects (Di Chiara and North, 1992; Markov decision problems) to monkeys while recording
Phillips et al., 1983), the direct involvement of dopamine dopamine activity and manipulating the motivational rel-
in mediating the reinforcing effects of opiates is ques- evance of outcomes, as in incentive learning.
tionable. Thus, for example, morphine and heroin self The close relationship between dopamine activity and
administration persists even after much of the dopamin- temporal difference error in reinforcement learning laid
ergic activity in the ventral striatum is abolished by bare a new and rich connection between animal and
6-OHDA lesions (Dworkin et al. 1988; Pettit et al., 1984). artificial decision making. The powerful logic of this
There are a number of reasons for supposing that the seems to have acted as a blinder to the results of the
incentive value of foods and fluids is mediated by activa- sophisticated motivational experiments that we dis-
tion of the endogenous opiate system. First, morphine cussed here, that provide significant constraints on this
administration increases food intake (Gosnell and
connection. As in our admittedly preliminary proposal,
Majchrzak, 1993; Pecina and Berridge, 2000) and both
taking note of these data should lead to richer and more
increases the incidence of ingestive taste reactivity pat-
psychologically and neurally faithful models.terns to sweet tastes and reduces the rejection reactions
produced by bitter tastes (Clarke and Parker, 1995; Acknowledgments
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